Simple Summary: An animal must harvest resources from its environment in order to survive, 7 prosper and reproduce. How the animal interacts with its environment to achieve these outcomes 8 remains a topic of ongoing enquiry. The long-held view that the environment exerts an instrumental 9 influence over the animal is contested by theories that propose that a mutualism exists between the 10 two. This paper provides a brief introduction to these latter so-called ecological models of the animal 11 environment relationship. As a first step, the animal must sense the environment. The contemporary 12 model that sensing and acting operate through a process of prediction and correction (termed active 13 inference) complements the ecological models. As well as sensing the external environment, the 14 animal needs to sense and control its internal physiological environment and also the environment 15 of (immunological) molecular structures that it encounters in its internal and external worlds. The 
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To survive, thrive and reproduce an animal must harvest resources from its environment. How does the animal find the resources it needs? In fact, the animal is faced with two environments, one 48 external and the other internal. This review provides a brief introduction to some historical accounts 49 and contemporary views of how the animal senses and acts on its two environments to realise 50 meaning in the entities it senses, and how the meaning that arises through actions confers agency on 51 the animal that enables regulation of behavioural, physiological and immune functions.
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Commonalities are examined between von Uexküll's theory of umwelt, Gibson's theory of 53 affordances, Patten's model of environs, Walsh's theory of situated Darwinism, the active inference 54 model of neural function based on the free energy principle, and Tauber's concept of eco-55 immunology. It is hoped this outline will encourage readers to explore these concepts in more detail.
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The animal's relationship with its external environment
57
In everyday life we think of the external environment as a concrete, structured, objective reality 58 that we and other animals interact with continuously. This materialist conception of a mechanical 59 environment was challenged in 1909 by the Estonian biologist von Uexküll who proposed that the 60 animal is immersed in its surround world (umwelt) in a manner by which the animal and its 61 environment constitute a functional interacting unit,, or function circle [1, 2] . Uexküll proposed that 62 for each species the umwelt is structured in signs or marks that the animal senses. In Uexküll's view 63 the environment for each species is subjective and unique. can be surfaces to stand on, to lie on or to rub against, objects to chew, air to breathe, and so on. For 70 a goat climbing on a cliff face to access plants and salt to eat, the crevices and ledges are affordances, 71 but for cattle these same ledges may provide no affordance [5] . Affordances describe a relationship 72 between the animal and its environment that can change as the animal develops through its life 73 history [6] . Gibson considered that information in the environment, which he termed ecological 74 information, has an objective character that provides a unique resource enabling the animal to acquire 75 the substantive resources required for its existence [3, 7] . On Gibson's view, affordances contain 76 information that gains meaning or value through the action possibilities they offer an animal [7, 8] .
77
On this view of the environment from the perspective of ecological psychology, two species in one 78 location may interact with differing sets of affordances that for each constitutes its own niche. In von 
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The interaction between the animal and entities of the environment in the utilisation of 
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Drawing on the von Uexküll's concept of umwelt and JJ Gibson's concept of affordance, Patten
95
[12] proposed that the organism and the environment do not constitute a dualism bound together .
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Recent models of neural function suggest that rather than operating as a stimulus response all be initiated in an anticipatory manner in response to non-immunological cues.
296
The third question, does the immune system exercise immune agency, is more problematic. Here identity is dynamic and adjusts to the needs and opportunities offered by the environment" (p221).
317
Thus the immune system does not operate to guard a defined immune self, rather "organismic 
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The final question about the operating principle of the immune system is also problematic. Many this formulation, agency is a process that can vary in degree and change over time.
364
In metaphysical terms, this account sees agency and the ability to garner meaning from 365 environmental information as a process rather than a thing, substance or attribute of the organism.
366
Here agency has a "process" ontology rather than a "thing" ( 
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In practical terms, this account highlights the opportunity to provide animals in our care with
372
an environment that fosters their ability to learn the opportunity for actions that confer agency over 
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Within the framework of information theory, acquisition of agency is an entropic process that 425 occurs through internalisation of unpredictability (surprise) from the environment into the animal.
426
Emergence of a felicitous interdependent "function circle" between organism and environment is less 427 probably again than organism as agent, and hence contains more entropy than an environment 428 organism dualism.
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If there is value in analysis of the organism environment relationship at this level of abstraction,
430
it may lie in the understanding it provides of the integration within the animal of behavioural,
431
physiological and immune functionalities, and the opportunities that flow from this understanding 432 to better manage animals within our care.
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